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Analyzing the stock…
70
Gathering technical, fundamental, and market data — a few seconds
Consumer Staples · ·
$12.80
▼ $0.10 (-0.8%)
Market data updated: 09/22 04:05 AM
Fundamentals updated: 09/21/2026
News analyzed: 09/22/2026
Market Cap
$1.12B
Day Range
$12.59 - $13.06
52-Week Range
$10.07 - $15.53
Beta
—
Next Earnings
16.12.2026
Support
$11.69
Resistance
$14.22
AVO is a stock from the Consumer Defensive sector — Food, beverages, and household products — steady demand even in a recession, since these are essential consumer goods.
+3.6% (1Y)
Strengths: 12/31 factors positiveRisk: Medium
This score and all analysis on this page are for informational and educational purposes only and do not constitute investment advice. Read the full disclaimer
Weighted: Technical 25% · Fundamental 20% · Growth 15% · Valuation 15% · News 10% · Quality 10% · Risk 5%
Overall Score
🟡 Mixed
Technical Trend
🟢 Bullish
Insiders
🟢 Bullish
Computed directly from the same signals behind the score above — not AI-generated.
Biggest positive driver
Leverage risk
Debt/equity: 0.16
Risk
Biggest negative driver
DCF Fair Value
Estimated fair value: $9.53 vs. price $12.80 (-25.5%)
Fair Value
What to watch next
When today echoes the past.
NO RELIABLE ECHO FOUND
Only 2 historical analog(s) found after removing overlapping dates — too few for a statistically meaningful comparison.
Historical matches considered: 2
TIME ECHO identifies historical situations that resemble the current market state. Historical outcomes are not guarantees of future performance. Similarity does not imply causation, and results may change as new data becomes available.
🗓️ What Changed This Week
🌱 Building History
We don't have a real data point from a week ago for this stock yet. The weekly comparison will appear once enough history has accumulated.
📊 Score History
54
Today
—
30D
—
90D
—
1Y
🐂🐻 Investment Thesis
🐂 Bull Case
🐻 Bear Case
🔍 What Could Prove This Wrong
This isn't a price-direction forecast — just a synthesis of real, already-computed data, and future conditions that could change the picture.
🧬 STOCK DNA
This stock's profile across 8 real dimensions — a research tool, not a recommendation
Growth
53
Quality
47
Value
38
Momentum
67
Risk
54
Sentiment
68
Fundamental
46
Institutional
96
Stocks with a similar DNA right now
This stock hasn't been analyzed by StockIQAI's movement engine yet — coverage is still expanding. Check back soon.
Recent media coverage of Mission Produce, Inc. has centered on its upcoming **Q3 earnings report** (scheduled September 8, 2026) and its financial outlook amid industry shifts. Analysts discuss pricing pressures, potential volume growth, and the impact of **Peruvian production increases** on its supply chain. The **integration of Calavo** is also highlighted as a key growth driver, alongside debates over whether its stock (AVO) is overvalued or worth holding. Concerns about profitability and market competition are briefly noted.
AI summary based on English-language news sources only — not investment advice.
Everyone's writing about Mission Produce, Inc.. News trend score: 68. Reason: 9 of the last 20 articles are positive, versus 6 negative.
News trend analysis is based on article sentiment only, and is not investment advice or financial counsel. Read the full disclaimer
🌡️ Emotional Temperature
17
🎯 Conviction (vs. Emotion)
37
Psychology
33
Fundamentals
46
Technical
67
Valuation
38
The price rise has far outpaced the actual improvement in fundamental data.
Price, volume, and sentiment accelerating together — a sign investors are chasing the price, not just following it.
Extreme momentum, price far above its moving average, and a large premium over fair value.
A sharp drop, unusual volume, and negative news sentiment all at once — selling pressure that looks emotional.
The stock is moving in lockstep with its peers at the same intensity, rather than on its own data.
Price (3M)
+11%
Market Narrative
63
Fundamental Reality
37
Narrative Gap
+26
🔀 Psychology Acceleration
News attention/sentiment is running well ahead of the price move itself.
🧠 StockIQ Psychologist
AVO’s psychology score of 31 highlights **overconfidence** as the dominant bias, driven by a 35% premium to DCF fair value despite stagnant EPS growth and negative momentum. The narrative gap (41 vs. 37) suggests investors may be overestimating intrinsic value or ignoring fundamental deceleration. While peers underperformed today, the stock’s isolated outperformance lacks herd dynamics. The key question: *Is the premium justified by future growth, or does it reflect overvaluation?*
Updated: 09/08/2026, 06:01 PM
What could change this?
👥 What the crowd believes
"Mission Produce Q3 Earnings Coming Up: Here's What Lies Ahead"
"Here's Why the Calavo Integration Matters for Mission Produce's Growth"
"Can Higher Volumes Offset Mission Produce's Pricing Pressure?"
"AVO Stock Looks Expensive: Buy Now or Wait for Better Entry Point?"
📈 8D Investor Psychology
Signal classification confidence: High (confidence in the behavioral read, not a price prediction). Describes observable market behavior, not what any individual investor thinks, and is not a buy/sell signal.
🏛️ Investor DNA — Historical Investors
A Historical Strategy Simulation: assuming each investor follows their documented principles, how would they rate this stock today? This is not a prediction of what they would actually do.
🟢 Best match
Charles Mackay — 73/100
🔴 Weakest match
Jack Schwager — 19/100
🗣️ Why do they disagree?
The methodologies here split sharply between cautious optimism and outright rejection of this stock. Charles Mackay’s high score suggests no obvious signs of speculative frenzy, while Nelson, Bagehot, and Loeb all find it moderately attractive—either because it’s positioned favorably in market cycles, has decent liquidity, or aligns with capital-preservation principles. However, even Marks and his market-cycle variant see it as mid-cycle, leaving room for doubt. The middle tier—including Smith, Housel, and the efficient-market camp—cautions that while the stock isn’t terrible, it lacks the clear long-term or risk-adjusted appeal needed for a confident hold. Meanwhile, Graham’s strict valuation rules, Lynch’s growth hurdles, and Fisher’s quality standards all dismiss it outright, while Livermore and Schwager’s trend-following discipline flatly reject it as a trade. The extreme divergence—from Mackay’s 83 to Schwager’s 7—reflects a clash between those who see it as a relatively stable, crowd-free opportunity and those who view it as fundamentally flawed or mispriced.
Charles Mackay
Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (1841)
🟢 73
No obvious signs of crowd mania
Key question
Am I being swept along with the crowd, or thinking for myself?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Walter Bagehot
Lombard Street (1873)
🟢 67
Adequate but not exceptional liquidity
Key question
Does this company have enough liquidity to survive real stress?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Gerald M. Loeb
The Battle for Investment Survival (1935)
🟡 60
Moderate risk to capital
Key question
How much capital could I lose here if I'm wrong?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Howard Marks
The Most Important Thing (2011) / Mastering the Market Cycle (2018)
🟡 57
Mixed — a good business, but expectations may already be high
Key question
What is the market probably misunderstanding about the risk here?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Samuel Armstrong Nelson
The ABC of Stock Speculation (1903)
🟡 57
Mid-cycle — no strong signal either way
Key question
Is the price overextended, or is there still room to move?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Howard Marks (Market Cycle)
Mastering the Market Cycle (2018)
🟡 55
Somewhere in the middle of the cycle
Key question
Where are we in the cycle right now — near a hot extreme, or a cold one?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Edgar Lawrence Smith
Common Stocks as Long-Term Investments (1924)
🟡 53
Reasonable but not a clear long-term holding
Key question
Is this a stock I'd be happy to hold and forget about for a decade?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Burton Malkiel & John Bogle
A Random Walk Down Wall Street (1973) / The Little Book of Common Sense Investing (2007)
🟡 50
Mixed case — the evidence for picking this stock over an index is not strong
Key question
Do I actually have an edge here, or do I just think I do?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Benjamin Graham (Enterprising Investor)
The Intelligent Investor (1949) — the Enterprising Investor chapters
🟡 42
Not statistically cheap enough for the Enterprising Investor's looser safety bar
Key question
Is the stock statistically cheap enough to justify the extra risk?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Benjamin Graham
Security Analysis (1934) / The Intelligent Investor (1949)
🟡 40
Fails most of Graham's defensive criteria
Key question
Where is my margin of safety?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Thorstein Veblen
The Theory of Business Enterprise (1904)
🟡 40
Mixed signal on whether growth translates to real profit
Key question
Is management building real value, or just building itself?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Morgan Housel
The Psychology of Money (2020)
🟡 36
The kind of volatility that tends to shake patient holders out
Key question
Could I live with this volatility long enough for compounding to actually work?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Jesse Livermore
Reminiscences of a Stock Operator (1923) / How to Trade in Stocks (1940)
🔴 31
Negative trend — against Livermore's core rule of trading with the trend
Key question
What is the price telling me right now?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Peter Lynch
One Up on Wall Street (1989)
🔴 24
Doesn't clear Lynch's growth-at-a-reasonable-price bar
Key question
Is the growth worth the price?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Philip Fisher
Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits (1958)
🔴 20
Doesn't show the quality/growth signature Fisher required
Key question
How exceptional is this business, really?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Jack Schwager
Market Wizards (1989)
🔴 19
No real setup here — the discipline Schwager's wizards shared would say stay out
Key question
What's the risk/reward here, and where is my exit point?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Based on the last 282 trading days, calculated from real price data. Click an indicator for details and a chart.
🟢 Most indicators support an uptrend (6 bullish · 2 bearish · 3 neutral)
A market-structure read based purely on real price and volume data — not full classic Wyckoff schematic identification (Phase A-E), but a quantitative analysis of what can reliably be computed: trading ranges, "effort vs. result", volume within the range, and Spring/Upthrust detection.
A trading range after an advance, but still without clear (volume-based) confirmation of a distribution phase.
Low confidence
$11.69
Range Bottom
$14.22
Range Top
50
Trading Days in Range
The Wyckoff Method, developed by Richard Wyckoff in the early 20th century, reads the balance of supply and demand through price and volume, based on the premise that large investors ("smart money") quietly accumulate shares before rallies and quietly distribute them before declines. The read here is based solely on real price and volume data — full, precise identification of classic Wyckoff patterns (such as Phases A-E) requires human chart-reading experience and judgment, so this is an approximate algorithmic read, not a substitute for professional analysis. This should not be considered investment advice.
Gross Margin
11.6%
Operating Margin
4.7%
Net Margin
2.7%
EBITDA Margin
7.2%
ROE
6.4%
ROA
3.8%
ROIC
—
EPS
$0.53
Cash
$64.80M
Total Debt
$95.80M
Current Ratio
1.95
Debt/Equity
0.16
How is Fair Value calculated? →
Current Price
$12.80
Estimated Fair Value (DCF)
$9.53
Model estimate — not a price target. Highly sensitive to growth/discount-rate assumptions.
Gap
-25.5%
🔴 Appears expensive relative to estimated value
Year 1 Growth Rate
11.1%
Discount Rate (WACC)
9.0%
Terminal Growth Rate
2.5%
Projection Years
5
| Year | Growth Rate | Projected FCF | Present Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 11.1% | $41.33M | $37.92M |
| 2 | 9.0% | $45.03M | $37.90M |
| 3 | 6.8% | $48.10M | $37.14M |
| 4 | 4.7% | $50.33M | $35.66M |
| 5 | 2.5% | $51.59M | $33.53M |
Base FCF (last actual year)
$37.20M
Terminal Value
$813.55M
Present Value of Terminal Value
$528.75M
Enterprise Value
$710.90M
Net Debt
$31.00M
Equity Value
$679.90M
*The DCF model is an estimate based on assumptions — not a guaranteed forecast. You can change the assumptions to examine different scenarios.
Book Value per Share
$8.23
Tangible Book Value per Share (Tangible NAV)
$7.68
Sentiment based on basic keywords (not AI) — 9 positive, 5 neutral, 6 negative out of the last 20 articles.
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Mission Produce, Inc. (AVO) currently has a StockIQ AI score of 54/100, rated "Moderate". The score is a weighted average across up to 7 categories (technical, fundamental, growth, fair value, news, quality, risk), based on real data only.
AVO currently scores 54/100 (Moderate) across the categories we measure. StockIQ doesn't give buy/sell recommendations — use this as one data point in your own research, not as investment advice.
Per StockIQ's DCF model, AVO's estimated fair value is $9.53, which is 25.5% below the current price of $12.80. This is one valuation model among several signals in the fair-value category, not a price target.
AVO's technical score is 67/100, which currently reads as bullish — based on real price/volume signals (moving averages, RSI, MACD, and more), not a prediction of what happens next.
Based on the real signals StockIQ computed: Debt/equity: 0.16; Current ratio: 1.95; Price is above the 50-day average.
Based on the real signals StockIQ computed: Estimated fair value: $9.53 vs. price $12.80 (-25.5%); Operating margin is eroding over time; Calmar: 0.30 (3y annualized return 10.1% / max drawdown 34.1%).
StockIQ has no recorded dividend payment history for AVO.
Real transactions by officers and insiders, as reported to the SEC on Form 4 — 24 purchases and 1 sales out of the last 25 filings.
| Name | Transaction Type | Date | Shares | Change | Price |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Globalharvest Holdings Venture Ltd | Open Market Purchase | 9.7.2026 | 592,957 | +592,957 | $13.28 |
| Globalharvest Holdings Venture Ltd | Open Market Purchase | 9.7.2026 | 12,963,396 | +592,957 | $13.28 |
| Globalharvest Holdings Venture Ltd | Open Market Purchase | 8.7.2026 | 687,222 | +687,222 | $13.42 |
| Globalharvest Holdings Venture Ltd | Open Market Purchase | 8.7.2026 | 12,370,439 | +687,222 | $13.42 |
| Globalharvest Holdings Venture Ltd | Open Market Purchase | 7.7.2026 | 491,865 | +491,865 | $13.40 |
| Globalharvest Holdings Venture Ltd | Open Market Purchase | 7.7.2026 | 11,683,217 | +491,865 | $13.40 |
| Globalharvest Holdings Venture Ltd | Open Market Purchase | 6.7.2026 | 650,415 | +650,415 | $12.73 |
| Globalharvest Holdings Venture Ltd | Open Market Purchase | 6.7.2026 | 11,191,352 | +650,415 | $12.73 |
| Pack Jay A | Open Market Purchase | 30.6.2026 | 40,000 | +40,000 | $12.10 |
| Giles Bryan E | Open Market Sale | 29.6.2026 | 5,000 | -5,000 | $12.13 |
| Taylor Bruce C. | Open Market Purchase | 23.6.2026 | 70,283 | +70,283 | $11.25 |
| Taylor Bruce C. | Open Market Purchase | 23.6.2026 | 855,842 | +70,283 | $11.25 |
| Taylor Bruce C. | Open Market Purchase | 22.6.2026 | 29,717 | +29,717 | $11.36 |
| Taylor Bruce C. | Open Market Purchase | 22.6.2026 | 785,559 | +29,717 | $11.36 |
| Taylor Bruce C. | Open Market Purchase | 17.6.2026 | 286,410 | +286,410 | $11.27 |
| Taylor Bruce C. | Open Market Purchase | 17.6.2026 | 755,842 | +286,410 | $11.27 |
| Taylor Bruce C. | Open Market Purchase | 16.6.2026 | 13,590 | +13,590 | $11.40 |
| Taylor Bruce C. | Open Market Purchase | 16.6.2026 | 469,432 | +13,590 | $11.40 |
| Pack Jay A | Open Market Purchase | 15.6.2026 | 77,831 | +77,831 | $11.34 |
| Pack Jay A | Open Market Purchase | 15.6.2026 | 110,719 | +110,719 | $11.34 |
| Taylor Bruce C. | Open Market Purchase | 15.6.2026 | 300,000 | +300,000 | $11.29 |
| Taylor Bruce C. | Open Market Purchase | 15.6.2026 | 455,842 | +300,000 | $11.29 |
| Taylor Bruce C. | Open Market Purchase | 12.6.2026 | 10,000 | +10,000 | $11.14 |
| Taylor Bruce C. | Open Market Purchase | 12.6.2026 | 155,842 | +155,842 | $11.16 |
| Taylor Bruce C. | Open Market Purchase | 12.6.2026 | 755,505 | +10,000 | $11.14 |
Official FINRA data — the number of shares open in short positions, plus daily short-sale activity.
4,902,595 shares short as of 2026-08-31 · vs. 4,980,808 on 2026-07-31
Official biweekly report (FINRA Rule 4560) — no real higher-frequency data exists for this metric.
65.5% of trading volume this week was short selling, vs. 75.2% the prior week
Based on daily short-sale volume (Reg SHO) — a different metric from the open short interest above: this is daily trading volume, not an open position, so it updates weekly rather than biweekly.
Full breakdown of every data type and its source: Data Sources · Methodology